Inside A7: How Russia built a parallel cross-border payments network

Russia’s attempts to circumvent Western financial sanctions have developed into a sophisticated parallel payments architecture combining traditional banking, front companies, commodity revenues, promissory notes and stablecoins.

Inside A7: How Russia Built Payment Alternatives

A Financial Times investigation based on leaked internal documents from A7, the Kremlin-backed payments group founded by Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, shows that Rosneft-linked traders supplied more than $2bn in hard currency to the network. A7 then used those funds to settle international obligations for Russian businesses that had lost access to conventional correspondent banking channels.

The findings provide a striking update to earlier evidence showing how A7 was building alternatives to Swift.

Oil Revenues Became Payments Liquidity

The mechanics underline how unconventional the network became.

According to the leaked documents, A7 used front companies in overseas jurisdictions to receive foreign-currency export proceeds generated by Rosneft-linked oil traders. Those exporters were compensated domestically in roubles, while the hard currency remained abroad and could be used to settle invoices for Russian customers.

At least 200 front companies were identified in the wider investigation, while A7 employees reportedly created false invoices and documentation internally referred to as “legend creation”. The FT separately found that more than $6.9bn passed through the international banking system using the structure.

For payments providers, the important point is that sanctions evasion did not mean abandoning established financial infrastructure. Instead, the network found ways to reconnect with it indirectly.

Stablecoins Added Another Settlement Layer

Crypto provided an additional route.

Payments Industry Intelligence first reported in June 2025 that rouble-backed stablecoin A7A5 had processed around $9.3bn within four months. By January 2026, blockchain analytics company Elliptic estimated cumulative transfers had exceeded $100bn, with much of the activity involving exchanges between A7A5 and Tether’s USDT.

The leaked A7 material also indicates that some Rosneft-linked counterparties had been settling transactions using USDT.

Yet blockchain rails have proved less resistant to enforcement than their architects may have hoped. Elliptic says A7A5 transaction volumes subsequently fell 96% from their peak, following coordinated sanctions and restrictions on access to crypto exchanges.

A Hybrid Network Is Harder to Police

The UK has responded by explicitly targeting A7-linked entities and crypto infrastructure, describing the network as using third-country financial institutions to regain access to international payment channels.

The broader lesson is that modern sanctions evasion is no longer divided neatly between banking and cryptocurrency.

A7 demonstrates how traditional settlement, commodity flows, legal instruments and digital assets can be assembled into a single cross-border payments system.

For banks, processors and compliance teams, that makes the challenge considerably harder: identifying risk increasingly means understanding not merely where a payment travels, but the economic network that supplied the liquidity behind it.